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The Economic Rationality of the Japanese Distribution System 
The unique features of the Japanese distribution system are usually 
described as backwards and economically inefficient. In academic writing on 
the subject on both sides of the Pacific, references to Japanese tradition, 
culture, history, and laws and regulations are frequent. As examples see 
Yoshino (1971), Ratcliffe (1975), Tsuruta (1980), Tamura (1981), Tsurumi 
(1982), and Wada (1986). The features of Japan's distribution system that are 
most often claimed to defy economic rationality include (1) the ubiquity of 
small retail stores and the long and convoluted channels through which goods 
must be shipped in order to reach them, (2) the tendency of manufacturers to 
impose vertical restraints on retailers and wholesalers, including resale price 
maintenance, assignment of exclusive territories, and insistence on exclusive 
dealing, and (3) unlimited acceptance by manufacturers of returns of unsold 
merchandise. 
Contrary to the conventional view, each one of these three characteristics 
of the Japanese distribution system can be best understood or explained through 
economic theory. The Japanese distribution system is economically rational: 
The ubiquity of small stores efficiently economizes on household storage and 
shopping cost. The vertical restraints generally have enabled manufacturers to 
induce efficent behavior by retailers and wholesalers in the promotion and 
marketing of their products. And liberal returns policies have enabled 
manufacturers who must produce before learning the true demands for their 
products to make the best possible use of their imperfect information. As I 
describe these arguments in detail I shall be drawing heavily on previously 
completed work. Flath (1988), Flath and Nariu (forthcoming), and Flath 
(forthcoming). 
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I. Ubiquity of Small Stores 
I-A. Background 
In Japan, small retailers are particularly common. In 1982 there were 
145.3 retail stores per 10,000 persons in Japan, compared to 82.9 for the 
United States. The similar statistics for the United. Kingdom, France, and 
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West Germany were 62.7, 74.8 and 67.0, respectively. The long and complicated 
channels by which goods must be shipped in Japan are arguably corrollaries of 
the fact that there are many small stores in Japan. That is, the complicated 
channels are necessary because the retail destinations are so fragmented. 
That Japan's distribution system is inefficient for having so many stores 
has become a cliche that appears in academic and journalistic writing on Japan 
as well as in U.S. government position papers. There are two economic 
arguments on which the inefficiency claim has been based. One is the argument 
that Japan has a dualistic economy in which the distribution sector, unlike 
some other sectors, is economically backwards and riddled with anachronistic 
customs that have a cultural basis rather than an economic basis. In this 
view, the large number of stores in Japan is a symptom of economically wasteful 
overemployment in family enterprises, in Lewis' terminology: disguised 
unemployment. Patrick and Rholen (1987) have recently challenged the 
traditional dualism view, at least as regards current-day Japan, but only to 
replace it with an argument that is rather similar. They claim that those past 
retirement age (generally 55 to 60 years) and women are denied equal employment 
rtpport-.irrn ti P.n in gmyrhing nfhp.r fhart family Prifprpri SP. . Therefore they Set up 




small stores (or become subcontractors) because economies of scale are least 
there and the inefficiencies of their being prevented by discrimination from 
fully exploiting their comparative advantages will be minimized. If there were 
less discrimination against women and the aged, there would be fewer family 
enterprises in Japan and fewer small stores. 
The other inefficiency argument has to do with regulation. A succession 
of Japanese laws over the last half century have imposed bureaucratic obstacles 
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to the establishment of large stores. The Department Store Act of 1937, which 
was suspended in 1947 and then reinstated in 1956, required approval of the 
national government (Ministry of Commerce and Industry, prewar/Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry, postwar) for the opening of new department 
stores anywhere in Japan. In 1973 the Large Scale Retail Store Act replaced 
the Department Store Act and made the extent of floor space of proposed stores, 
rather than the nature of the stores, the criterion for necessitating MITI 
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approval. The cutoffs were 3000m in the largest cities and 1500m everywhere 
else; in fact almost all stores of larger floor space than these cutoffs had 
been department stores. Finally in 1978 this law was completely revamped so as 
to broaden its coverage to include all proposed new stores with floor space 
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above 500m . 
McCraw and O'Brien (1986) place great emphasis on these laws as the 
explanation for the large number of retail stores in Japan. As evidence that 
the laws have seriously restricted the growth of large stores they cite the 
marked drop in number of applications to open new stores following the 
enactment of the 1978 aiimieudmeuLs to the Large Scale Retail Store Act,—to a 
mere trickle in 1984 of less than 500 applications for permission to open 
3Tamura (1981), pp.1-14, and Tsuruta (1980), pp.13-27 
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stores with floor space in excess of 500m in all of Japan, a country of 120 
million persons. Tamura (1986), p. 86, cites the same evidence in making a 
similar argument. 
Though both the above arguments suggest that there are more small stores 
in Japan than is economically efficient, they leave aside the question of just 
how many stores would be economically efficient. We ought to consider whether 
in the absence of regulation and labor market dualism there would be an 
inherent tendency in Japan for there to be many small stores. And here some 
economic theorizing is helpful. 
The number of stores that minimizes the consumers' and retailers' combined 
storage and reorder costs given the demand, can be precisely related to cost 
parameters and to the geographic density of households, using the logic of 
economics. Having more stores per person reduces household inventory costs by 
shortening the distance from house to store for the typical consumer and 
enabling more frequent shopping trips for smaller loads. However having more 
stores increases the stores' combined inventory costs because it is relatively 
more costly to restock many stores than it is only a few. The Japanese pattern 
of many stores per person is economical where households are relatively 
inefficient at storage and reorder while retailers are relatively efficient. 
The high land prices and cramped living space make storage costly for the 
typical Japanese household, while the geographic smallness of Japan makes the 
cost of continually restocking a larger number of stores rather less than it 
would be in a vast country like the U.S.. On these grounds the many small 
fir.nrBs and r.nrrp.fipnnriingly p.nmpl nx di striVmfi rm rharmpT s are efficient  
adaptations to the circumstances of the country. The next four sections I-B, 
I-C, I-D, and I-E are a formal development of the above argument. 
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I-B. Assumptions 
There are two crucial assumptions to my economic model of the density of 
retail outlets. One is the assumption that retailers, as well as households, 
have Baumol-type storage and reorder technologies. The purpose of this 
assumption is to introduce consumers' and retailers' inventory costs in a way 
that is informative but tractable. The other crucial assumption is that, 
except for regulatory effects, the geographic density of retail outlets 
minimizes the households' and retailers' combined storage and reorder costs. 
One reason for assuming social optimality is that it enables one to ignore the 
pricing behavior of the sellers. This is an advantage because (pure) Nash 
equilibrium mill pricing strategies need not exist in the environment I 
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propose. The social optimality assumption amounts to the claim that retailing 
attains technological efficiency. 
Households. Let households be uniformly arrayed with density D across an 
unbounded plane. Suppose that each household consumes some nondurable good at 
rate q which is the same for all households and is independent of both the 
good's price and the household's storage and reorder costs. Let each household 
have storage costs equal to k per unit of average inventory of the nondurable 
good. Further, suppose that each time a household reorders it incurs costs 
equal to r times the distance from the household to the nearest retail outle 
On this point see Gabszewicz and Thisse (1986). In their terminology>^ 
model gives rise to "transportation costs" of consumers that are proportion 
to the square root of the distance to the store, and "production costs" ot 
stores that are proportionate to the square root of quantity supplied. 
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We presume that each household chooses a frequency of reorder that minimizes 
its own storage and reorder costs. 
Retailers. Retailers are uniformly arrayed across the plane, with density 
D. to be determined endogenously. We suppose that the households' reorders are 
utterly unsynchronized so that each retailer's inventories are depleted at the 
continuous rate (D/D-)q. Let retailers have storage costs K per unit of 
average inventory. Also, suppose that each time a retailer reorders he incurs 
costs equal to R, a constant. The uniform spatial density of retailers is 
endogenous and minimizes the global storage and reorder costs. 
I-C. Households' storage and reorder costs 
The storage and reorder cost of an individual household distance t from 
the nearest retailer is 
where 2. =• reorder quantity, which implies Jt/2 - average inventory and q/i -
frequency of reorder. The household will choose X to minimize this cost. One 
easily finds that -
from which we deduce that 
(3) s(t) - (2krqt)1/2. 
By assumption retailers are uniformly arrayed with mean density D. . Let 
us also assume, that the market served by each retailer is a hexagon with area 
Any regular polygon that fills the plane will yield qualitatively 
similar results to those that follow. See Cappoza and Van Order (1978), 
f.n. 4, p. 900. 
D ~X and radius D1"1/212"1/4. Then the storage and reorder costs of all the 
D/D households served by the same retailer are 
12"1/4D"1/2 x/73 . / 2 2 2 1 / 4 
(4) S(D.) - 12D / X J (2krq)1/Z(xN-y ) ' dy dx 
1
 0 0 
To evaluate (4), make the substitution y - x tantf, noting that 
(x2+y2)1//2=- x sec0, dy - x sec29 d$ , and x tan0 - 0 -• 0-0, 
and x tan0 - x/73 -* 0»3O. Now we have 
The storage and reorder costs per household served by the retailer are 
1-D. Retailers' storage and reorder costs 
Each retailer serves D/D.. households and incurs storage and reorder costs 
(7)
 S l-S= + ^  , 
where (D/D^)q = rate of depletion of inventory, and L - reorder quantity. 
Each retailer chooses L so as to minimize its storage and reorder costs. 
~One rinds that 
so that 
(9) S1(D1) - ^KRD^Dq)17? 
Thus the retailer's storage and reorder costs per household are 
(10) C^) - -\j±- - D'1/2 Dj / 2 (2KRq)1/2. 
I-E. Solution 
The global storage and reorder costs per household are 
(11) C(D1) - C()(D1) + C1(D1) . 
The density of retailers that minimizes this cost is that which equates the 
marginal reduction in the households' storage and reorder costs with the 
marginal increase in the retailers' storage and reorder costs: 
The logic of the model is -represented in figure 1. Exogenous changes that 
increase households' costs of storage and reorder induce an increase in the 
rip-ngi try nf rpt-a-n mitl P.ts, which economizes by shifting more of the storage and 
reorder costs onto the retailers. Exogenous changes that increase the 
retailers' costs of storage and reorder induce a fall in the density of retail 
9 
outlets, which economizes by shifting more of the storage and reorder costs 
back to the households. Greater geographic density of households implies 
greater reorder efficiency of the representative household and induces a 
disproportionately small increase in the density of retail outlets. 
I-F. Discussion, 
Even the conventional explanations for the ubiquity of small stores in 
Japan can be interpeted through the above framework. Overemployment in family 
enterprises might be thought of as lowering retailers' cost parameters R and K, 
inducing more outlets. In a global sense this phenomenon is wasteful (It is 
maintained that the families would be more productive in alternative pursuits), 
but from the view of consumers, the cost of physically transporting goods 
through the distribution system is made less by it. 
Regulation such as under Japan's Large Scale Retail Store Law can be 
treated as establishing lower bounds on the geographic density of retail 
stores. The precise placement of this lower bound will reflect local political 
conditions. 
The generally higher population density of Japan would seem to favor fewer 
retailers per household than in the U.S., which is quite the opposite of what 
is observed for most kinds of business. 
Any tendency towards greater division of labor within Japanese households 
than in American ones, with greater specialization in shopping in Japan, would 
tend to lower the reorder costs of households there (lower r), inducing fewer 
For any given number of stores per household the distance from the 
representative household to the nearest store is less as the density of 
households is greater. 
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stores, not more. To the extent Japanese derive pleasure from shopping, this 
too lowers the households' reorder costs and has similar effects. 
Preference for "fresh" provisions has no clear implication for the number 
of stores. The purchase of fresh produce certainly favors frequent household 
shopping trips, but also requires more frequent restocking of stores. The 
fundamental tradeoff between household inventory costs and distributors' 
inventory costs is encountered for fresh produce just as it is for other goods. 
The generally cramped living conditions and consequently high storage 
costs of nondurable goods for Japanese households (high k), would tend to favor 
more nondurables retailers in Japan, if the ultimate cause of the cramped 
living conditions, the high land prices, did not also cause retailers to have 
proportionately higher storage costs (high K). High household storage costs 
probably are a factor in explaining why there are so many more (nondurables) 
retail stores per person in Japan compared to the U.S.. 
Retailers in Japan have lower reorder costs (R) than those in the U.S.; 
because of the geographic compactness of the country the distance from store to 
reorder point tends to be short in Japan. 
Clearly the net effect of these various and conflicting influences on the 
costs and benefits of a proliferation of retail outlets can be sorted out only 
by empirical estimation. I have made a first step in this direction by 
estimating regression equations that explain much of the cross prefecture 
variation in number of stores of different kinds per household. Flath (1988). 
In that work economic variables such as fraction of each prefecture's 
population residing in densely inhabited districts, tatami mats per person, and 
motor vehicles per person, explain more variation in food stores per household, 
say, than does department stores per person. If a prefecture does have 
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relatively few department stores per person, presumptively because of 
strict application of the Large Scale Store Law, then indeed it also has 
relatively more food stores per household. But this inverse relation between 
number of department stores and number of food stores (and other stores), 
although statistically significant is not nearly strong enough to fully account 
for the Japan-U.S. difference in number stores. Regulati on is not the reason 
there are so many small stores in Japan. Rather the ubiquity of small stores 
in Japan is an economically ef f icent adaptation to geographic conditions. In 
Japan household storage costs are high and the costs of restocking a 
multiplicity of retail stores are low compared to other countries. Both 
conditions favor the economic rationality of a system in which retail outlets 
are ubiquitous. 
II. Vertical Restraints 
II-A. Background. 
Antimonopoly laws pertaining to resale price maintenance, exclusive 
dealing stipulations, and customer restrictions are generally more permissive 
in Japan than in the U.S.. In some instances Japan's Antimonopoly Law 
explicitly permits these practices, as in resale price maintenance of 
copyrighted works. More usually, although the Antimonopoly Law would in a 
vague way seem to disallow the practices (Current Japanese proscriptions 
disallow "unjust" customer restrictions and exclusive dealing), the sanctions 
are so weak that the law is widely flouted. When antitrust proceedings are 
brought against a company for having established violative marketing 
arrangements the result is almost always that the company agrees to discontinue 
the offending arrangements without being penalized. There are a number of 
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these cases. And it is from the published decisions in the cases that one 
learns of specific examples of vertical restraints in distribution in Japan. 
The examples are widespread across industries (including some with enormous 
sales such as home electronics, cosmetics, cameras, and furniture), and have 
contributed greatly to the view that the Japanese marketing system is complex, 
difficult for foreigners to understand, hard to rationalize in economic terms, 
governed by tradition and custom rather than by economic rationality, and so 
on. 
Because the Japanese examples of vertical restraints arise as antitrust 
cases, questions of whether vertical restraints might be abusive or 
monopolisitc, whether they should be allowed and so on have diverted attention 
away from the more basic question of why the companies that have imposed 
vertical restraints stood to profit. The legal issues have been a source of 
confusion in the U.S. also but academic economists have striven hard to 
overcome it, so that there now exist widely accepted economic explanations for 
many of the U.S. antitrust cases involving vertical restraints. Of course none 
of these explanations refer to unique aspects of American tradition and 
culture. Before appealing to Japanese tradition or culture to explain vertical 
restraints in Japan we ought to first try economic explanations for these as 
well. In fact many of the explanations developed for U.S. examples can be 
usefully applied. I will next briefly describe some of these explanations with 
reference to a selection of Japanese antimonopoly cases that I believe to be 
representative. 
II-B. Resale Price Maintenance 
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By r.p.m. I mean retailers' agreement not to resell the products of 
manufacturers at prices below some stipulated level--a manufacturer imposed 
price floor. In a justly famous 1960 article, Telser proposed an explanation 
for r.p.m. that seems to fit many of the Japanese examples. Telser argued that 
makers will often desire that presale demonstrations be given because some 
customers who would otherwise not buy the product at all will do so if they are 
given a presale demonstration of the product. But retailers can not recover 
the costs of the demonstrations because they must compete in price with free-
riding rivals who avoid giving demonstrations themselves but attract customers 
who have obtained the demonstrations elsewhere. The result is that retailers 
do not provide the demonstrations. If however the maker maintains a minimum 
retail price sufficiently above the wholesale price that it compensates 
retailers for the costs of providing demonstrations, then retailers find that 
they can only have customers and be profitable if they provide the 
demonstrations (Customers will buy from the retailer who provided them with the 
presale demonstration if his price is no greater than that of his rivals). 
Resale price maintenance can therefore be to induce retailers to provide 
presale demonstrations. This argument is most compelling for products that are 
somewhat complicated or unfamiliar, or for which there exist many optional 
features or gradations of quality and so on. As Japanese examples for which 
the argument seems to fit well I would cite the cases involving Matsushita , 
Matsushita Denki Sangyo K.K. 17 shinketsushu 187 (F.T.C. [consent] No. 4, 
1967) March 12, 1971. 
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Nikon , and France Bed , involving cameras, electric appliances, and furniture 
respectively. 
An additional rationale for maker-imposed price floors is to prevent 
arbitrage from upsetting a profitable system of price discrimination. For 
instance Organ Needle held a near monopoly of sewing machine needles, 
enjoying a market share greater than 80%, and sought to exploit this by, among 
other things, seeing that higher prices were set in sales of needles to 
individuals than in sales to the more elastic demanders, industrial customers. 
But because Organ distributed the needles through wholesalers it was necessary 
to control the wholesalers' prices, preventing discount sales to elastic 
demanders. 
II-C. Manufacturer-Irrrposed Maximum Resale Price 
Occasionally manufacturers will stipulate maximum prices, rather than 
minimum prices, a price ceiling rather than price floor. Here the rationale is 
to prevent the retail or wholesale dealers from exploiting the manufacturer's 
monopoly. The dealers will only be in a position to do this anyway if there 
are but few of them within a particular geographic area. This was the case 
Nihon Kogaku Kogyo K.K., 19 shinketsushu 25 (F.T.C. [recommendation] no. 
7, 1972) June 30, 1972. 
9France Bed K.K., 22 shinketsushu 127 (F.T.C. [recommendation] No. 2, 
1976), Feb. 20, 1976. 
Also sec Tazalci (1976). 
100rugan Bari K.K. 25 shinketsushu 24 (F.T.C. [recommendation] No. 8, 
1978), December 12, 1978. 
Also see Watanabe (1979). 
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with Takeya . Takeya's miso "monopoly" (Its national market share was never 
higher than about 4%) was based on its distinctive flavor and reputation for 
quality supported by television advertising. As is common in Japan, the 
distribution channel for Takeya miso encountered a bottleneck at the wholesale 
level, with but five primary wholesalers in the Kanto area. To prevent these 
wholesalers from exploiting Takeya's monopoly, Takeya imposed maximum resale 
prices on the wholesalers and devoted extensive effort to enforcing the 
stipulation, including resort to an elaborate system of record keeping, 
circuitous methods of payment, and detailed assignments of retailers to 
specific wholesalers, and of secondary wholesalers to specific primary 
wholesalers. 
II-D. Exclusive Territories 
Monopoly at the wholesale or retail level is sometimes the result of the 
manufacturer's own customer assignments. Makers sometimes deliberately limit 
the number of dealers permitted to carry their product or even assign each 
dealer an exclusive geographic monopoly. They do this so that each dealer will 
himself capture more of the benefits of his efforts at promoting the product or 
maintaining its quality and have an optimal incentive, rather than having the 
benefits spillover to rivals and so a disoptimal incentive. 
12 For instance Yakult assigned exclusive geographic territories to the 
bottlers of its yoghurt drink so that each would be more inclined to maintain 
K.K. Takeya, 25 shinketsushu 32 (F.T.C. [recommendation] No. 10, 1978) 
Feb. 13, 1979. 
Also see Izumisawa (1979). 
1 o 
K.K. Yakuruto Honsha, 13 shinketsushu 72 (F.T.C. [recommendation] No. 
19, 1965), Sept. 13, 1965. 
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quality and refrain from diluting the drink. Yakult found it necessary also to 
stipulate maximum price and minimum quantity in order to further stimulate 
bottlers to promote demand and maintain quality and refrain from monopolistic 
restrictions of output. The problem of optimal arrangements between Yakult and 
each bottler to whom it had assigned an exclusive geographic territory were as 
in the Rey and Tirole (1986) example of a bilateral monopoly with effort, 
pp.10-11. 
1> 
II-E. Exclusive Dealing 
Manufacturers occasionally stipulate that retailers of their products rio^  
handle rivals' products. In particular they do this when they intend to assis 
retailers in their selling efforts and wish to assure that the benefits redo^ 
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on themselves rather than on rivals. For example Gakken insisted that 
independent salesmen of its educational books and magazines deal with it 
exclusively, in order that the sales leads it provided not be used by the 
salesmen to benefit rivals. Refer to Marvel (1984) for a parallel example £n 
the U.S. involving the sale of hearing aides through independent exclusive 
sales representatives. 
II-F. Discussion 
Though I have only introduced a small number of examples I believe them 
be typical and representative. Most of the examples resemble specific U.S. 
antitrust cases in fundamental respects. The externality problems and 
successive monopoly problems that give rise to vertical restraints are very 
much the same in both Japan and the U.S.. If there is a difference between 
vertical restraints in Japan and in the U.S. it is that in Japan, the ubiquity 
of small retailers and resultingly complex distribution channels frequently 
complicate the enforcement of vertical restraint stipulations by makers. 
Countering this, in Japan antitrust laws are less of an encumbrance to makers 
who seek to impose vertical restraints. 
I next address a marketing practice common in Japan, that many have 
thought to be clear evidence of economic perversity. 
Gakushu Kenkyusha, 26 shinketsushu 74 (F.T.C. [consent] No. 3, l97 ' 
Dec. 20, 1979. 
Also see Hokari (1980). 
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III. Returns Policy 
III-A. Background. 
In Japan makers of a wide range of products liberally accept returns of 
unsold merchandise. In fact unlimited returns are often allowed for books, 
magazines, apparel, cosmetics, and. electric appliances. Also returns are at a 
high rate, but are apparently not allowed to an unlimited extent, for records, 
14 pharmaceuticals, and stationery. One should understand that it is not the 
return of damaged or defective merchandise that is at issue here but rather 
merchandise that is merely unsold and returned to the maker at the convenience 
of the retailer. This is a practice used in the U.S. and Western Europe only 
for newspapers, magazines, and books, and a few other items. It seems to be 
much more widespread in Japan though the evidence for this is largely 
anectdotal. 
To understand the economic basis for the returns system in Japan we must 
first recognize that in industries in which the practice is common, returned 
merchandise is often or even usually destroyed rather than being held in 
inventory for sale at a later time. This suggests a monopoly pricing model of 
the returns practice and I shall next describe such a model. 
III-B. Fixed-price Policy for a Vertically Integrated Monopolist 
Imagine that the maker of a product is a monopolist (or Chamberlinian 
monopolistic competitor) and that he must decide how much to produce in advance 
of learning the true final demand for his product. Such a monopolist will be 
The returns policy in Japanese marketing is discussed in a general way in 
keizai kikakucho (1986), and in Ejiri (1979). 
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left with unsold merchandise if he has set a price in advance of knowing the 
true demand and sticks to the price even though the scale of demand turns out 
to be less than he had hoped. The alternative in which the monopolist is never 
left with unsold merchandise, is for the monopolist to sell all that is 
produced at whatever price just clears the market, a high price if demand turns 
out to be great and a low price otherwise. It is quite easy to construct 
examples in which the fixed-price regime in which unsold merchandise is a 
possibility is more profitable than its variable-price alternative, and just as 
easy to construct counterexamples. 
For instance, as an example in which the fixed-price regime is more 
profitable, imagine that a monopolist must produce before knowing the demand 
for his product exactly, and that he does know that the demand curve will be 
linear and he knows the vertical intercept but does not know the slope of the 
demand curve. Suppose also that demand exists for one period only. If 
production costs are negligible the monopolist can approach a first best 
outcome by setting a price equal to half the demand intercept and producing an 
amount that will be demanded at that price in only the most optimistic case. 
The monopolist would produce less than this if he intended instead to sell all 
at a market clearing price but his profit would be less in that case. 
Therefore the monopolist sets a price and sticks to it even though it is apt to 
result in unsold merchandise. He will resist the temptation to sell the unsold 
merchandise at a lower price rather than destroying it because if he gets a 
reputation for marking down unsold merchandise he will be unable to sell at the 
price he first announces when demand is slack. 
To switch the example to one in which the policy of selling all produced 
at a market clearing price dominates, we need only introduce production costs 
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that are large, or alter the uncertainty so that the horizontal intercept of 
the demand curve is known in advance of production rather than the vertical 
intercept. See the mathematical appendix of Flath and Nariu (forthcoming) for 
an algebraic statement of the argument in the above two paragraphs. And see 
the final paragraph of that appendix for an example that extends the argument 
to a monopolistically competitive oligopoly. 
The argument thus far, although it abstracts from many features of actual 
industries, already enables us to uncover some likely features of the 
industries in which destruction of unsold merchandise is apt to be common. 
There should be some element of monopoly, unique characteristics of the 
products of individual firms. The demand for the product or the product itself 
should be "perishable" like the demand for a specific day's newspaper or a 
specific season's fashionable attire, or a load of books more costly to store 
for resale at a later date than is worthwhile. The elasticity of the demand 
facing any one firm should be fairly easy to predict but the scale of demand 
must not be. For instance this could be so if a firm could accurately predict 
the elasticity of demand of the representative buyer of its product, say a 
weekly magazine, but could not accurately predict how many individuals will 
each buy one unit of the product. Finally, production costs should be small 
relative to the demand. All these factors make it more likely that destruction 
of unsold merchandise will be one part of a profitable pricing strategy for the 
firms in an industry. 
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III-C. Fixed-price Policy When the Product is Distributed Through Independent 
Retailers 
In the argument thus far the maker sells directly to final demanders so 
the implementation of a fixed-price policy poses no special problems. If 
instead the maker sells to independent retailers then he has two different ways 
of implementing a fixed-price policy, each with its own advantages and 
disadvantages. The first way is to stipulate minimum retail prices (resale 
price maintenance, or RPM) , and the second way is to accept unlimited returns 
of unsold merchandise (returns policy). 
Under RPM, first the maker produces some quantity of the good and 
stipulates a wholesale price and a minimum retail price. Then the retailers 
set order quantities. Last, the true final demand determines the quantity of 
unsold goods, which are absorbed by the retailers. 
Under the returns policy, the maker produces some quantity of the good and 
stipulates a wholesale price, and himself determines the quantity to ship to 
each retail outlet, but extends unlimited returns priveleges to retailers. 
Last, the true final demand determines a retail price and determines what 
quantity is sold to consumers at each outlet and what quantity is returned to 
the maker. The possibility of returning unsold merchandise places a floor on 
the market-determined retail price. 
Both RPM and the returns policy enable the maker to fix a retail price at 
which his product will be sold, in contrast with a fixed-quantity, variable 
price policy. With independent retailers, the fixed-quantity policy would 
entail that the maker produces some quantity of the good and sets a wholesale 
price, and then retailers set order quantities; the true final demand 
determines a market clearing retail price. The advantages of either RPM or 
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returns policy over this policy are precisely the advantages to a vertically 
integrated maker in setting price rather than quantity, both in advance of 
knowing the true demand. These advantages and the necessary conditions for 
their existence have been detailed above. We now turn attention to the choice 
between RPM and returns policy, accepting as a premise that at least one 
dominates the fixed-quantity alternative but realizing that this is a special 
case. 
III-D. RPM Versus Returns Policy 
One important difference between RPM and returns policy is that RPM places 
the risk of unsold merchandise on the retailers while returns policy places 
that risk on the maker. If these risk considerations were the only important 
difference between RPM and returns policy then efficient choice between these 
two alternatives would be governed solely by the degree of risk averseness of 
maker and retailers. For instance, if the maker is risk neutral but retailers 
are risk averse then the returns policy would be favored over RPM. 
Besides the allocation of risk, an additional consideration is the way in 
which RPM or returns policy enable the maker to exploit the retailers' private 
information about demand. Under RPM the quantity shipped to each retailer is 
chosen by the retailer himself, but under the returns policy the maker 
determines shipment quantities. Only under RPM will the allocation of the 
product across retailers reflect each retailers' private information about the 
demand he expects to face. Under the returns policy the allocation across 
retailers reflects the maker's information. The advantage of exploiting the 
better information is that by more closely matching initial shipments with 
actual demand at each outlet, the costs of either overproducing or of 
23 
trartsship-ping merchandise from outlets with overstocks to those with stockouts 
caii be minimized 
If the retailers' information about the local demand, is better than the 
maker's Information, then on this ground RPM would be favored over the returns 
policy. This need not be true in every case but would seem to be the usual 
case, j"ust as the retailers being more averse to risk than the maker would seem 
to be the usual case. It thus appears that tension between RPM and the returns 
policy is inevitable, RPM favored for its use of information but returns policy 
favored for its allocation of risk. Clearly, the quality of the retailers' 
and maker's private information about the demand, and the costs of shipping 
merchandise and the production costs, as well as the degrees of risk averseness 
of -the maker and retailers, all play a role in determining the relative 
adv^ rLtages and disadvantages of RPM and the returns policy. 
Ill-E. Discussion 
Too much has been made of the "uniqueness" of Japanese manufacturers' 
unlimited acceptance of returns of unsold merchandise. While the practice may 
ind-eed be more prevalent in Japan than elsewhere, the difference is one of 
degree onLy. For example returns policy is common in the publishing industries 
of the U.S. and European countries as well as in Japan. The demands for 
magazines and newspapers and the demands for many types of books are both 
There may arise cases where the maker has better information about the 
Local demand than do the retailers. In these cases, which would seem to us to 
~"be e X C t i ^ L l u i i a l , — a r c t i i m n p o l i c y wnn~M maVp h p f f p r H S P o f i n f o r m a t i o n t h a n  
would RPM. For example, small makers who accept returns from chain department 
stores may do so because their own information about the local demand is better 
than that of the department stores and returns policy makes better use of the 
information than would RPM. This is in sharp contrast with the conventional 
explanation which is that the department stores are exploiting the small makers 
by ins isting upon liberal acceptance of returns. 
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temporary and difficult: to predict. These are among the requisites for the 
fixed-price policy described above to be profitable. 
Where retailers are more averse to risk than are makers and have less or 
no greater ablity than makers to predict the demand they will face, the makers 
implement the fixed-price policy by accepting unlimited returns. In the 
reverse cases RPM is the preferred way of implementing the fixed-price policy. 
Newspaper carriers and small independent stores are typically quite risk averse 
and enjoy liberal returns priveleges. Large chain stores, which tend not to be 
so risk averse, are more often subject to RPM and enjoy limited returns 
priveleges. Because of the ubiquity of small stores in Japan it is natural, 
even economically rational, that the returns policy is more pervasive in Japan 
than in the U.S. and Europe. 
IV. Conclusion 
Even the most admiring authorities on Japan's highly prosperous economy 
have generally withheld from praising the distribution sector and treated it 
instead as a puzzling abberation: How could the manufacturing system of Japan 
be so innovative and effficent and the marketing system so backwards? The 
ubiquity of small stores in Japan and the complicated contractual arrangements 
between makers, wholesalers, and.retailers, often including liberal extension 
of returns priveleges, have struck many observers as clear evidence of waste 
and inefficiency. 
I myself am not so convinced that the Japanese distribution system is 
economically wasteful. Predictions that traditional ways of organizing the 
distribution of products -would soon be eclipsed by more modern systems are less 
believable with each passing year. Perhaps we should reasses whether the 
persistence of the distinctive features of the Japanese distribution system 
really is due to cultural intertia or government regulation as so often 
claimed. I believe that, rather, there is an underlying economic rationality 
to each of the unique features of Japan's marketing system, and it is this 
economic rationality that accounts for the persistence of those features. 
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